Vishny [LLSV] 1997 [LLSV] , 1998 . Indirect protection is provided by ensuring that information viewed as price relevant, such as the disclosure of potential conflicts of interests, is made available to investors. Transparency is enhanced through regulated disclosure requirements, stock exchange listing requirements, and the use of generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") (Bailey, Karolyi and Salva 2002; Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker 2002) . Potential conflicts of interest are exposed by disclosing board composition, relationships with auditors and the compensation of senior management. Taken together these direct and indirect forms of investor protection may provide a competitive advantage for a country's equity market relative to other jurisdictions.
Cross-country comparisons find that the United States and Canada offer similar treatment of minority shareholders and creditors, with a low risk of contract repudiation or expropriation of assets. However, Canada and the United States differ along a number of dimensions of corporate governance. For instance, Canada features a higher concentration of corporate ownership than the United States. Concentrated ownership may result in minority shareholders being treated unfairly, if the controlling shareholder uses its position to extract rents or otherwise limit the growth opportunities of the business. Canada is also perceived to have weaker enforcement of insider trading laws than the United States. Weaker enforcement may result from the regulatory framework for securities markets in Canada, where responsibility is shared among thirteen provincial bodies rather than unified under one agency like the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). These differences in corporate governance may result in weaker investor protection in Canada relative to the United States.
The literature on law and finance has identified the macro-level impact of various components of corporate governance on overall equity market valuation. La Porta, Lopez, Vishny (1997, 1998) find that one variable -the origin of the legal system -can explain significant variation across capital markets, with English common law countries that feature the greatest investor protection exhibiting larger and more valuable equity markets. use another variable -the enforcement of insider trading laws -to explain a decline in the cost of equity across equity markets. Himmelberg, Hubbard and Love (2002) link weaker investor protection with a higher concentration of inside equity ownership and a higher cost of equity. Pagano and Lombardo (1999) document similar links between total stock market returns and the strength of judicial efficiency and the rule of law. Morck et al (2000) document that the variability of individual stock returns is positively associated with stronger investor property rights. Having established the overall market impact of corporate governance on equity valuation, this literature is now focusing on the impact of differences in corporate governance on firm-level valuation (Klapper and Love 2002; Siegel 2002) . We test this link between difference in corporate governance and firm-level valuation using Canadian-and U.S.-listed firms.
Differences in corporate governance across markets are also being used to explain the home bias phenomena.
1 Home bias refers to the unwillingness of investors to diversify their portfolios internationally, making the proportion of foreign assets held by domestic investors too small relative to the predictions of modern portfolio theory. Two aspects of corporate governance are seen as contributing to home bias -asymmetric information and differences in ownership structure. Coval and Moskovitz (1999) and Portes, Rey and Oh (2001) show that U.S. portfolio managers exhibit a strong preference for locally headquartered firms, due to asymmetric information between home and foreign investors. Hasan and Simaan (2000) provide theoretical support for this view by showing that home bias is consistent with rational mean-variance portfolio choice under informational constraints. Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2001) argue that low credibility of financial information in many countries inhibits U.S. investment abroad.
Huberman (2001) and Coval and Moskowitz (1999) document regional home bias within the United States, as seen in geographic bias of shareholders in regional Bell operating firms, concentration in household's portfolios, and employee holdings of employers' stocks in their retirement portfolios. This research suggests that investors ignore the principles of portfolio theory and invest in the familiar. Stulz, Dahlquist, Pinkowitz and Williamson (2002) argue that the prevalence of closely-held firms in foreign countries with poor investor protection explains part of the home bias of U.S. investors. Overall, the literature on home bias suggests that concerns regarding the quality of corporate governance and disclosure in foreign jurisdictions may outweigh the potential benefits of greater international diversification.
We test the impact of weaker corporate governance and of U.S. investors' home bias on the valuation of Canadian equity relative to U.S.-listed equity by comparing the book-to-market and earnings-to-price ratios of Canadian-and U.S.-listed shares from 1991 to 2000. By comparing the valuation of Canadian firms cross listed on a U.S. stock exchange first with other Canadianlisted firms and second with other equities listed in the United States, we discern the effects of weaker corporate governance and home bias on the valuation of Canadian-listed equity. Our results show that Canadian-listed firms are priced at a discount to their U.S.-listed peers, after controlling for firm-specific and market-specific factors that may affect valuation. This discount is linked to differences in corporate governance between Canada and the United States and the home bias of U.S. investors. We document that cross listed Canadian firms receive a premium valuation relative to exclusively Canadian-listed firms, but are priced at a discount to other U.S.
listings. These results suggest that cross listed Canadian firms that a re subject to SEC The paper is organized as follows: Section I develops the hypotheses to explain cross-border differences in the valuation of Canadian-and U.S.-listed equity. Section II discusses the data and the methodology for testing these hypotheses. Section III presents empirical results.
Section IV concludes.
I. Hypothesis Development
The corporate governance indicators collected by LLSV (1997, 1998, 2000) show that Canada and the United States have similar scores on many dimensions of direct and indirect investor protection. Both countries offer similar treatment of minority shareholders and creditors, with a low risk of contract repudiation or illegal expropriation of assets. However, Canada scores lower than the United States on a number of important measures of corporate governance. These differences may lead to the perception that investor protection in Canada is weaker than in the United States. There are four main differences between Canada and the United States, namely:
the nature and concentration of firm ownership, government regulations restricting firm ownership, the structure of securities regulation, and the enforcement of insider trading laws.
First, LLSV (2000), Morck et al. (2000) , and Doidge et al. (2001) show that concentrated corporate ownership is associated with lower firm valuations, larger bid-ask spreads, and lower secondary market liquidity. This lower valuation is linked to the choices o f controlling shareholders who are in a position to extract rents at the expense of minority shareholders. Stulz et al. (2002) , Attig et al. (2002) and Morck et al. (2000) find that the level of insider ownership of publicly-traded firms in Canada is significantly higher than in the United States. (Karolyi 1998) .
Their shares may trade indirectly in the form of American Depository Receipts ("ADRs"), with different types of ADRs associated with varying disclosure and filing requirements. An alternative to an ADR listing for a foreign firm is to list on a U.S. exchange as an ordinary share.
Canadian firms are listed as ordinary shares, must register with the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC"), and provide a full reconciliation of financial accounts that comply with U.S GAAP. 4 By listing as an ordinary share, a Canadian firm meets all the same requirements as a U.S. firm. Canadian compliance with U.S. disclosure requirements has been facilitated following the introduction of the Multi Jurisdictional Disclosure System in 1991. 5 Most studies of international cross listing employ an event study approach to capture how the act of cross listing affects a company's share price, turnover and bid-ask spreads. 6 International cross listing has been found to generate an increase in the price of a domestic stock, due to some combination of a reduction in the cost of equity, access to a wider investor base, greater secondary market liquidity and reduced trading costs (Bancel and Mittoo 2001; Doukas and Switzer 2000; Errunza and Miller 2000; Karolyi 1998, 1999; Karolyi 1998; Koedijk and Van Dijk 2000) . A number of studies argue that higher valuations following cross listing are due to increased disclosure or better information environments, as seen in greater analyst coverage and improved earnings forecasts (Bailey et al. 2002; Blass and Yafeh 2001; Doukas and Switzer 2000; Lang, Lins and Miller 2002; Leuz 2002) . In practice these effects have been difficult to disentangle.
One strand of this cross listing literature highlights the impact of corporate governance on the decision to cross list and the associated stock price reaction. Pagano, Roell and Zechner (2001) argue that firms choose to cross list on a foreign stock exchange offering more effective investor protection, higher disclosure standards, and more stringent regulation. These stock exchanges develop a better reputation and attract greater liquidity that leads to a greater price impact following cross listing (Bancel and Mittoo 2001; Blass and Yafeh 2001; Miller 1999; Pagano, Roell and Zechner 2001) . While intuition might suggest that firms in emerging markets would benefit most from the greater disclosure associated with a U.S. cross listing, Bailey et al (2002) find that the change in information environment is greatest for firms from developed countries as seen in increased return and volume reactions to earnings announcements. Coffee (1999 Coffee ( , 2002 and Stulz (1999) argue that a foreign firm can signal its quality to investors by bonding itself to the U.S. securities regime. Controlling shareholders of a foreign firm that is cross listed in the United States are less able to extract private rents from their firm, aligning their incentives with minority shareholders. Siegel (2002) finds that this bonding is enforced by the markets through a reputation mechanism, and not by the U.S. courts. Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2001) test the hypothesis that investor protection is the driving factor behind the decision to cross list, and find that foreign firms that cross list on a U.S. stock exchange exhibit a higher Tobin's Q than their peers listed exclusively in the home market.
If differences in corporate governance between countries affects equity valuation, the literature on cross listing suggests that a foreign firm can increase its valuation by cross listing on a U.S.
stock exchange that features stricter corporate governance rules than the home market. This proposition can be tested directly by studying Canadian firms that cross list on a U.S. exchange.
By comparing the steady-state valuation of cross listed Canadian firms with exclusively Canadian-listed firms, this study can gauge the effect of corporate governance on valuation.
Given that cross listed Canadian firms are subject to the higher levels of disclosure and stricter supervision in the U. 
II. Data and Methodology
This study uses annual company accounts data and quarterly price data for both U.S. and The impact of corporate governance and home bias on cross-border valuation is tested through a series of regressions, where the dependent variable is a measure of the valuation of a firm's equity. The book-to-market ratio is used in one specification and the earnings-to-price ratio in a second specification. Explanatory variables consist of company-specific variables, marketspecific variables, and a dummy variable which captures remaining systematic effects. Given that there are many factors that affect corporate governance, some of which cannot be quantified, and there is no variable which captures home bias directly, this paper employs this dummy-variable approach in order to capture systematic effects of differences in corporate Details on the formulae used to calculate the dependent and independent variables used in the regressions are included in an appendix. Following the convention in the literature, the book-tomarket and earnings-to-price were calculated with the price as of the following March in the denominator. 7 The book-to-market and earnings-to-price ratios are used instead of price-tobook and price-to-earnings in order to mitigate the effect of outliers French 1992, Penman 1996) .
In order to capture the impact of corporate governance on valuation, two categories of control variables were included in the regressions. First, a group of six company-specific variables are calculated for each firm-year observation in order to control for firm size, profitability, cost of equity, future expected growth rate of earnings per share, share turnover and analyst coverage of the stock. Firm size (SIZE) is measured by the log of total assets, denominated in U.S.
dollars, using the end-of-year exchange rate to convert Canadian dollar assets. The proxy for profitability is the return on equity (ROE). To test the robustness of this measure, ROE is decomposed into profit margin, asset turnover and financial leverage following the Dupont method in a second specification. The valuation of a firm's equity is directly related to the future growth prospects of the firm's earnings. This variable is captured by including the future expected growth rate of earnings-per-share (GR) based on analysts forecasts , using the longest available geometric growth rate available up to a maximum of five years.
The cost of equity (K) is computed by the single-factor Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM").
The nominal annualized yield on the 90-day Treasury bill in each market is used to proxy for the risk free rate. Company betas are estimated as follows. The firm's beta is estimated using the market model, where the monthly returns are regressed on the domestic value-weighted market return. 8 Each security has to have valid sequential stock returns for at least 36 months prior to
March of every year. Given that a company-specific beta was not available for all the firms in the sample, an unlevered average beta is calculated for each 3-digit SIC industry, for each year, using the betas that were available in the CRSP and CFMRC databases. Each firm's levered beta is then calculated by taking the mean unlevered beta for its industry, and levering it based on each individual firm's debt-to-equity using the Hamada formula. 9 In this formula, a constant marginal effective tax rate of 35 per cent is used for all industries. 10 When calculating the cost of equity for each firm, the equity market premium used in the CAPM calculations is based on the stock market where it is listed. Canadian-listed firms are benchmarked against the TSE 300 composite index while U.S.-listed firms are benchmarked against the Standard & Poor's 500
index. 11 The equity premium for Canada and the United States is taken from Claus and Thomas (2001), who estimate the equity market premium over the period 1985 to 1998 for Canada at 2.23% and for the United States at 3.40%. 12 Given the significant differences in risk free rates between Canada and the United States in particular during the early 1990s, the cost of equity is also decomposed into two components -the risk free rate and the company-specific equity premium.
The cross listing literature has identified a number of channels for the positive share price reaction associated with a cross listing. Increased liquidity of a firm's equity following cross listing is one of the principal factors (Chan, Fong and Stulz 1994; Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan 1998; Foerster and Karolyi 1998; Karolyi 1998; Smith and Sofianos 1997) . A second factor is increased visibility, greater investor recognition and a better information environment following cross listing (Baker, Nofsinger and Weaver 1999; Bancel and Mittoo 2001; Foerster and Karolyi 1999; Lang, Lins and Miller 2002; Leuz 2002; Miller 1999) . Both increased liquidity and visibility are associated with lower risk premiums and a lower cost of equity. A firm's secondary market liquidity is measured using share turnover (TURN), calculated as the average number of shares traded in a month divided by the total number of shares outstanding, adjusted for stock splits, dividends and other factors. The visibility and information environment of a firm is proxied using the number of analysts (ANLYST) following the stock, with no distinction given to the reputation of the analyst or the quality of their coverage.
Finally, we include a market-specific variable that captures the relative performance of the national equity market where the share is listed. While both the Canadian and the U.S stock markets rose over the sample period, the Canadian market underperformed the U.S. market by a noticeable margin due to the "irrational exuberance" witnessed in U.S. equity markets over the mid-to late-1990s. The risk-adjusted stock market return (SMR) is calculated as the excess stock market return over the risk-free rate for the past year divided by the standard deviation of this excess market return for this period, which is the Sharpe ratio. This variable may also capture differences in the volatility of the two stock markets, which is not encapsulated in the betas calculated above.
To test the hypothesis that Canadian-listed firms trade at a discount relative to U.S.-listed firms (H1) we restrict the sample to Canadian firms listed exclusively in Canada and U.S.-listed firms excluding cross listed Canadian firms, and estimate the following model:
13 VM = a + ß 1 SIZE + ß 2 ROE + ß 3 K + ß 4 GR + ß 5 TURN + ß 6 ANLYST + ß 7 SMR + ß 8 CTRY + e (1) where VM stands for the valuation measure, using the book-to-market ratio in one specification and the earnings-to-price ratio in a second. CTRY is dummy variable set equal to 1 for The regressions are estimated using weighted least squares, where the weight is the number of observations in each year. We follow the method recommended by Belsley et al. (1980) to identify influential observations and eliminate outliers. 14 Only firms that had positive earnings are included in regressions using earnings-to-price as the dependent variable, in line with other studies in the literature. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics on the three categories of firms. Panel A of Table I provides statistics on the relative size of firms in the sample, based on total assets converted to U.S.
III. Results
dollars at year-end exchange rate. The median U.S-listed firm is roughly twice the size of a Canadian-listed firm, but only about half the size of the median cross listed Canadian firm. The distributions for all three categories of firms are positively skewed, suggesting that Compustat's database is biased towards the largest firms i n both countries. Panel B of Table I provides details on the valuation and profitability of Canadian-and U.S.-listed firms. Cross listed
Canadian firms are included with other Canadian observations for this comparison. Over the past decade, the median Canadian-listed firm traded at a higher book-to-market and earningsto-price, suggesting that Canadian-listed firms traded at a discount relative to U.S.-listed firms.
In addition, the median Canadian-listed firm had lower ROE over the past decade.
[Insert Table 1] The regressions in Table 2 test the hypothesis that Canadian-listed firms trade at a discount relative to U.S.-listed firms (H1). The dependent variable in the first regression is the book-tomarket ratio, and in the second is the earnings-to-price ratio. In the long form of this regression,
we check the robustness of the measures of ROE and cost of equity by substituting the components of ROE and cost of equity.
The book-to-market regressions are shown in the first two columns of Table II . The country dummy is positive and significant at less than 1%, indicating that Canadian-listed firms have higher book-to-market ratio relative to U.S.-listed firms. The coefficient on the country dummy indicate that Canadian-listed firms in this sample are discounted by 15 -21 percent over U.S.-listed firms based on book value, making this impact large and economically important. The coefficients of the control variables are generally significant with the predicted sign. The log of total assets is negative and significant in one specification, but is not significant using the components of ROE and cost of equity. The coefficient of ROE is positive and significant, consistent with a view of mean reversion of earnings. 15 The positive sign and significance of cost of equity is consistent with theory, as firms with a higher cost of equity receive a lower valuation represented by a higher book-to-market ratio. The expected growth rate of EPS is positive and significant, consistent with the mean reversion indicated by the coefficient of ROE.
A greater number of analysts leads to a lower book-to-market ratio and a higher valuation under one specification. The same effect is true for share turnover, where greater turnover produces a lower book-to-market ratio implying premium valuation. The variable capturing the performance of the stock market is negative and significant, confirming that firms valuations are higher when the overall stock market is outperforming.
The earnings-to-price regressions shown in the final two columns (2003); the discount is most apparent when using the book-to-market ratio.
[Insert Table 2] A possible explanation for the findings in Table 2 is the differences in Canadian and U.S.
GAAP. While Canadian and U.S GAAP are in large part consistent, there are differences in the treatment of certain items, such as foreign exchange gains and losses, gains and losses on marketable securities, and development costs that may lead to differences in both earnings and book value of equity. Hence, the differences in the valuation measures may be attributed to differences in accounting methods across the two countries. However Bandyopadhyay, Hilton, and Richardson (2001) and King and Segal (2003) show that Canadian and U.S. GAAP numbers are close substitutes by comparing the multiples of cross listed Canadian firms using both Canadian and U.S. GAAP. King and Segal (2003) show that the accounting differences have a minor and inconsistent impact on the valuation ratios, suggesting that accounting differences do not explain the discount of Canadian-listed firms relative to their U.S.-listed peers.
A. Test of Corporate Governance
We test for the effect of corporate governance on valuation by comparing cross listed Canadian firms with the rest of the Canadian sample. This comparison controls for any ownership restrictions or home bias effect among Canadian investors. However, this comparison does not control for regulatory environment as the Canadian cross listed shares are subject to the stricter supervision and enforcement by the SEC. Table 3 are statistically significant. The coefficient of log of total assets is positive in all cases but only statistically significant in one case. The direction of this effect indicates that smaller firms in this sample received a higher valuation, consistent with the size effect identified in the literature. The coefficient of ROE is negative but not significant in the book-to-market regressions, although its components are significant with mixed directions. ROE and its components enter with a positive sign in the earnings-to-price regressions, consistent with the view of mean reversion in earnings. As before, the cost of equity has a positive sign for both book-to-market and earnings-to-price.
Contrary to the results in Table 2 , the expected growth rate of EPS and the number of analysts are not significant or economically important in most cases. Share turnover has the expected negative sign but is insignificant in all cases. The coefficient of risk-adjusted stock market return is negative in all four regressions, and significant in three regressions.
[Insert Table 3 ]
B. Test of Equity Home Bias
We test the third hypothesis by restricting the sample to cross listed Canadian firms and other U.S.-listed firms, which are both available to U.S. investors, and re-estimate equation 2. Results are shown in Table 4 .
The dummy variable for cross listed Canadian firms is positive and significant in all regressions, and is economically large in the book-to-market regressions. This result suggests that cross listed Canadian firms continue to trade at a discount valuation relative to other U.S.-listed firms.
This finding is consistent with the literature on home bias, which finds that U.S. investors apply a discount to foreign firms (Ahearne, Griever and Warnock 2001; Kocherlakota 1996) . Cross listing on a U.S. exchange as an ordinary share does not appear to remove the valuation discount based on book-to-market, although the discount on earnings-to-price is quite small.
The direction and significance of the coefficients on the control variables in Table 4 have the expected signs and statistical significance, and are very similar to the results reported in Table   2 .
[Insert Table 4 ]
C. Impact of Industry Membership
While earlier regressions reported in Tables II, III multiples of earnings, cash flow and book value. However, the relative weighting of industries across the Canadian and U.S. samples may be an important omitted variable explaining the results. While different industry composition is expected to be captured by the variable measuring the risk-adjusted stock market return for each national equity market, the robustness of this assumption is tested directly by using a dummy variable for industry membership.
In order to test the sensitivity of the earlier results to industry membership, the regressions reported above are re-estimated using a dummy variable based on the one-digit SIC code. All industries with SIC code 1,000-1,999 are allocated to a dummy (Industry 1), all industries in 2,000-2,999 to a second dummy (Industry 2), and so on. In total this procedure creates five dummy variables for SIC codes 1,000-4,999 and 6,000-6,999. 16 A description of the industries included in each broad SIC code is shown in Table 6 .
[Insert Table 6 ] We control for industry by including separate dummy variable for each industry. In addition, we allow for different coefficients of the independent variables for each industry. While this approach generates different factor loadings on the control variables, it provides the best fit for each industry without constraining the comparison to one base or reference industry. This approach is designed to identify the presence or absence of a valuation discount within each industry, not to compare valuation across industries. The problem with this approach is that it is econometrically very costly. First, there are fewer Canadian observations relative to U.S.
observations to begin with and this approach divides the Canadian observations across five industries. Second, the use of industry dummies reduces the degrees of freedom by a factor of 5 (the number of separate SICs considered) as different coefficients are estimated for each explanatory variable for each of the five industries. Tables 6, 7 , and 8 repeat the regressions shown in Tables 2, 3 and 4 ; only the coefficients for the dummy variables for each industry are shown. As before, the short form specification uses ROE and cost of equity, while the l ong form substitutes the components of ROE and cost of equity.
The regressions in Table 6 test the hypothesis that Canadian-listed firms trade at a discount to U.S.-listed firms (H1) after controlling for industry membership directly. The sample is firms listed exclusively in Canada and U.S.-listed firms, excluding cross listed Canadian firms. As before, exclusively Canadian-listed firms trade at discount to U.S.-listed firms across all industries, as seen by the positive coefficient on the country dummy variables. The coefficients in the book-to-market are positive and significant for all industries. The coefficients on the country dummies in the earnings-to-price regressions are positive and significant for three industries ( representing mining, utilities, construction, and manufacturing) but are not statistically significant for two others (representing transportation and financial services firms).
Overall, these results suggest that Canadian-listed firms trade at a discount relative to U.S.-listed firms.
[Insert Table 6] The regressions in Table 7 test the hypothesis that differences in corporate governance contribute to the Canadian discount, by comparing cross listed Canadian firms with exclusively
Canadian-listed firms. The dummy variables for cross listed Canadian firms in industry 2, 3 and 5 are negative and significant, suggesting that cross listed firms receive a premium valuation relative to other Canadian listings in these industries. Cross listing does not generate any clear benefits for firms in mining, utilities and construction (industry 1) and the transportation industry (industry 4), as the coefficient on the dummy variables is not different from zero.
[Insert Table 7] The final set of regressions in Table 8 [Insert Table 8] Taken together, these results provide support to the earlier findings. Canadian-listed firms trade at a discount to their U.S. peers, when measured using book-to-market and earnings-to-price.
The analysis suggests that the differences in corporate governance between Canada and the United States, as reflected in the premium valuation of cross listed Canadian firms over their Canadian peers, contribute to a Canadian discount even when controlling for specific industries.
In addition, the discount of cross-listed firms relative to other U.S.-listed firms suggests home bias by U.S. investors.
D. Impact of Relative Share Turnover
A second sensitivity analysis concerns the impact of relative share turnover across stock We compute relative share turnover (RTURN) as the ratio of Canadian share turnover to U.S.
share turnover. RTRUN will be the largest for cross listed Canadian firms that continue to trade predominantly on a Canadian stock exchange, and will be smallest for those firms that trade predominantly on a U.S. stock exchange. We divide the sample of cross listed firms into quartiles based on relative share turnover, with a dummy variable created for each quartile. The firms traded predominantly in the United States are assigned to the first quartile (RTURN_Q1) with this group acting as the base or reference case in the regressions that follow. As with the sensitivity analysis on industry membership, only the coefficients for the dummy variables for each quartile of relative share turnover are shown. Again the short form specification uses ROE and cost of equity, while the long form substitutes the components of ROE and cost of equity. [Insert Table 9 ] Table 10 reports the sensitivity analysis for regressions using cross listed Canadian firms and other U.S.-listed firms. Panel A reports the regressions on book-to-market and earnings-toprice. The results using book-to-market reported in columns 1 and 2 confirm that Canadian cross-listed firms trade at a discount to U.S.-listed firms in all cases. Thus, the location of share turnover appears not mitigate the Canadian discount. The results using earnings-to-price reported in columns 3 and 4 present a different picture. In this case, cross listed Canadian firms that trade predominantly in the United States (RTURN_Q1) achieve a premium valuation based on multiples of earnings than other U.S.-listed firms. However, this effect reverses as the relative share of U.S. share turnover declines, with the other three quartiles of cross listed
Canadian firms trading at a discount.
The conflicting results for cross listed Canadian firms that trade predominantly in the United
States (RTURN_Q1) may be attributed to the inclusion of firms experiencing losses when estimating the book-to-market regressions. Column 5 and 6 report the regressions on book-tomarket when loss firms are excluded. In this case, the coefficient of RTURN_Q1 is no longer statistically different from zero, but the remaining results confirm the findings in columns 1 and 2.
[Insert Table 10 ] This sensitivity analysis suggests a more nuanced conclusion on the benefits of cross listing on a foreign stock exchange. When a cross listed firm is predominantly traded in the United States, 
IV. Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of corporate governance on firm valuation. Prior literature on corporate governance established that weaker corporate governance has an adverse effect on macro variables such as growth in GDP and overall equity market valuation. Weaker corporate governance in foreign markets has also be used to explain U.S. investor home bias. This paper examines the firm-level effects by comparing the valuation of Canadian-and U.S.-listed equity over the past decade. Despite their broadly similar levels of investor protection, t here are a number of institutional differences between Canada and United States that contribute to a perceived weaker corporate governance of Canadian firms. The primary differences appear to lie in the more concentrated ownership structure of Canadian firms, the structure of the regulatory and supervisory framework, and the enforcement of insider trading laws.
The analysis indicates that exclusively Canadian-listed firms trade at a discount relative to U.S.-listed firms, on the basis of both book-to-market and earnings-to-price ratios. This discount persists after controlling for a number of factors known to i nfluence individual firm valuation such as firm size, profitability, cost of equity, future expected growth rates, analyst coverage and share turnover, as well as the risk-adjusted return of the national stock market where the share is listed. This discount exists across a range of industries.
The role of differences in corporate governance in contributing to this discount is tested by comparing the valuation of Canadian firms cross listed on a U.S. stock exchange with exclusively Canadian-listed firms. The cross listed Canadian firms are subject to the stricter regulatory requirements and supervision of the SEC. The results show that cross listed
Canadian firms trade at a premium relative to exclusively Canadian-listed firms, consistent with the hypothesis that stronger corporate governance leads to a higher valuation. This relationship exists despite controlling for the known valuation factors that might cause a firm to self-select to cross list. However this result only holds for a cross listed Canadian firm that succeeds in attracting higher relative share turnover in the United States than in the home market.
However, cross listing does not imply that a Canadian firm will be valued similarly to other U.S.-listed firms. Except for the cross-listed firms that are predominately traded in the United States, cross listed Canadian firms continue to trade at a discount relative to other U.S.-listed firms.
This result suggests that U.S. investors still exhibit home bias against foreign firms listed in the U.S. stock market, despite these foreign firms providing the same disclosure, using the same accounting rules and being subject to the same regulatory and supervisory framework as other U.S.-listed firms.
V. Appendix -Variable Definitions
Asset turnover = total sales / total assets = DATA12/DATA6 This table reports Level of statistical significance for two-tailed test:** = 1%,*= 10%. 
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